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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PLEADING,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE
NEW YORK COURTSt
HAROLD R. MEDINA
As it has always been a source of peculiar pleasure to me to address this
association, with many of whose activities I have so long been identified,
it would be ungracious of me to enlarge upon the difficulties which have beset
me in preparing this address. We lawyers are so frequently called upon to
put our shoulders to the wheel, particularly in times of emergency, that we
sometimes take on more than the traffic will bear. Now that I have, in
the performance of what I consider to be my duty, given up my teaching
activities, it has become practically impossible for me continuously to exam-
ine and test these details of procedure as I did" when I Was younger and
my professional -responsibilities were of a different character. Indeed, I
should not be here now were it not for Mr. justice Shientag., He has given of
his own time and energy with such a lavish hand, and has been so generous
and unselfish in his efforts throughout the years to benefit the c6mmunity)
and especially the members of the legal profession, jointly and severally, that
I simply could not say him nay. -
While the statutory changes in matters of procedure, generally 'during, the
years 1943 and- 1944 have been numerous, many of thenf relate to special
conditions arising out of the war and to details affecting proceedings- of" an
unusual character which would, in any event, require specific study by the
average practitioner. Happily, those alterations in the provisions applicable
to ordinary civil actions in courts of general or superior jurisdiction are
relatively few, and in practically every instance these changes make a clear
and substantial improvement in the law.
As on prior occasions, there will be no attempt to catalogue these recent
developments in the law of procedure in any complete and comprehensive
manner. Such a recital would be uninteresting and time consuming and
scarcely appropriate. Fortunately, a certain continuity with former addresses
can be maintained by the discussion of further developments in subjects
already treated. As to the remainder, it is hoped that the most vital as well
as the most interesting phases of the subject have been singled out for
explanation and comment............
tThis speech was given before the New York Association of the Bar on Jan. 31, 1945.
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AmENDED RULES OF CIVIL PRACTICE
The much needed general revision of the Rules of Civil Practice applicable
to pleadings became effective September 15, 1944.
. Rules 103 and 104. It is now clear that affidavits may be used in support
of all motions to strike as sham, whether addressed to a part of a pleading
under Rule 103 or to an entire answer or reply under Rule 104.
The procedure is similar to that on summary judgment motions, but not
identical. For example, the moving party has the entire burden on a motion
to strike as sham, whereas, after a prima facie showing, the adversary on
a summary judgment motion must come forward and show by evidence an
arguable defense or claim.
It is likely that motions to strike a part of a complaint as sham will be
used extensively, as they may be made to fit into a great variety of situations.
A good illustration of a pleading set-up where this particular technique is
applicable arose in Zwerdling v. Bent.' In that case the striking out of cer-
tain paragraphs of the second amended complaint as sham made the remain-
der of the complaint subject to a motion to dismiss under Rule 107 on the
ground that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by the six-year
statute of limitations.
Thie amendments to Rules 103 and 104 eliminate many confusing conflicts
in the various departments, and the rules are now in harmony with the
summary judgment procedure.
Rule 105. This rule as amended makes it clear that under Rules 102, 103
and 104, as well as Rules 106 and 107, the notice of motion must be served
mwithin twenty days of the service of the pleading to which it is addressed,
but may be made returnable after the twenty-day period.
Rules 106 and 107. Because of the title of these rules, most of us have
been accustomed to classify them as respectively applicable to cases where
the defect does or does not appear on the face of the complaint. The present
form of the rules as amended is more accurate and avoids certain technical
difficulties which I shall not stop to explain. Now the distinction is between
a motion made on the complaint and a motion made on the complaint and
an affidavit. Certain verbal changes are also made, and there is a specific
provision for the service of a notice of motion "at any time prior to trial,"
when the motion is addressed to lack of jurisdiction over subject matter.
Rules 109 and 110. The time element of motions addressed to the answer
1264 App. Div. 195, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 144 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd 291 N. Y. 654,
51 N. E. (2d) 933- (1943).
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is now made twenty days, as in the case of similar motions addressed to the
complaint, simply for the sake of uniformity. Another useful change author-
izes the court, as in the case of a motion for 'judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 112, to dismiss the complaint where a counterclaim or defense
in the answer is under attack, "even in the absence of a cross-motion." As
a motion addressed to a counterclaim or affirmative defense in an answer
searches the record, it is obviously in the interest of simplification to allow
such a dismissal, with leave to amend in appropriate cases.
The whole scheme of Rules 106 and 107 on the one hand and 109 and 110
on the other is harmonized by certain changes in Rules 109 and 110 to
conform them to what has already been explained with respect to Rules 106
and 107; and, with the exception of lack of jurisdiction of the person, which
is plainly inapplicable where defendant has served an answer, the grounds
of a motion under Rule 110 are made the same as those under Rule 109, by
adding to Rule 110 new subdivisions relating to lack of capacity, improper
counterclaim, the statute of limitations and infancy, all of which may con-
ceivably be made to appear by affidavit.
Another defect in the law, which I have pointed out on previous occasions,
is eliminated by the provision now contained in Rules 109 and 110 that:,
A person not a party to an action who is served with an answer pur-
suant to Section 271 of the Civil Practice Act may serve notice of motion
to dismiss the counterclaim .. . as if he had been named a defendant
in the action by the plaintiff.
Rule 111. The requirement that a motion addressed to the legal sufficiency
of a reply be made within ten days has at last been eliminated. This require-
ment was flatly inconsistent with Civil Practice Act Section 279, and doubt-
less caused 'some confusion. It is now provided that the notice of motion
specifying such an objection may be served at any time prior to trial.
Rule 113. The changes in the summary judgment procedure are in every
way desirable, and they will be referred to briefly in a moment. The result,
however, is a highly complicated mass of verbiage which I think has been
patched up to such an extent that it would be much better entirely to eliminate
the rule in its present form and substitute general language such as appears
in Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which, as to both plain-
tiffs and defendants, is applicable to all civil actions. When it was held by
the Court of Appeals 2 that summary judgment procedure was available to
a defendant in all actions, whether or not of the character set forth in the
2Lederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 459, 12 N. E. (2d) 544 (1938).
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preliminary enumeration applicable to plaintiffs, provided the motion was
based on documentary evidence or official record, there was reason to sup-
pose that the stage was set for a simple rule which litigants might use gen-
erally. In this, as in so many other matters of procedure, the basic, funda-
mental notion of simplicity seems not to receive the consideration it deserves.
In any event, subdivision 2 has now been changed by substituting "for a
sum of money" in lieu of "for a stated sum," so that summary judgment
notions may now be based on claims for alimony arising out of foreign
judgments. The language now makes it crystal-clear that summary judg-
ment may be given as the proofs require, irrespective of who is, the moving
party, and the rule is also made applicable as between co-defendants. Other
changes by way of clarification or codification have been made which do
not alter the existing law.
COURT OF APPEALS PRACTICE
To conform with the amended Section 7 of Article 6 of the New York
Constitution, which became effective January 1, 1944, certain changes have
been made in Civil Practice Act Sections 588, 589, 592, 601, 604 and 605.
The stipulation for judgment absolute practice is now applicable to special
proceedings. The procedure in applying for leave to appeal to the Court
of Apeals has also been improved by allowing the motion for leave to appeal
to be made in the first instance in the Court of Appeals. This will be most
helpful to lawyers in cases where the time element is important or where, as
is generally the case, there seems little reason to hope that the Appellate
Division will allow the appeal. The language of Section 589 as amended is
very carefully drawn so as to make mutually exclusive the two methods of
applying for leave to appeal. In other words, if a party defeated in the
Appellate Division there moves for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals,
and, for some reason or other, the Appellate Division should delay decision
of the motion, the applicant may not, in order to save time, or for any other
reason, proceed forthwith to move in the Court of Appeals. Having adopted
the traditional method of procedure, the applicant must await the decision
of his motion in the Appellate Division before he can apply to the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, if the motion is first made in the Court of Appeals and
there denied, it is too late to move in the Appellate Division.
Quite a number of other changes in Court of Appeals practice have been
made, but most of them are of a technical character. Lawyers should make
it a habit to study.with care the material appearing each year in the Report
of the Judicial Council. Indeed, the work of the Judicial Council in formu-
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lating and recommending improvements in our procedure has been one of
the most striking and significant developments of recent years.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS UNDER SECTION 322
Shortly after I left law school I met a friend who had graduated a year
or two before I did. Naturally, he seemed the embodiment of all wisdom,
and he was very free with his advice. The conversation drifted around to
motions, and he solemnly pronounced this dictum: "Don't bother looking up
a lot of law before making a motion-just rush right in and let the court
do the rest. This will save you a lot of work and many a headache too."
Needless to say, I very quickly found that this advice was bad on every count.
And yet instances arise every day of motions which seem to have been made
on the basis of my friend's theory. One would suppose that, at the very least,
an examination would be made of the procedure detailed in the very Section
of the Civil Practice Act or the Rule of Civil Practice applicable to the
motion under consideration.
A very recent case, which need not be identified, relating to admissions
practice under Section 322 will serve as an illustration. It will be recalled
that the procedure under this Section was discussed at some length in my
last address. My purpose then and my purpose now is to make the Bar more
familiar with this very useful procedural device. The language of the Section
is general. It provides "At any time after the pleadings are closed in an
action.. . ." The party desiring the admission then serves his demand and
the admission is deemed to have been made unless the party upon whom the
demand was served: (a) obtains an extension of time by motion on notice;
or (b) serves a sworn statement specifically denying the matters in question;
or (c) serves a sworn statement giving the reasons why he cannot truthfully
deny or admit, or setting forth some qualification, explanation or claim of
privilege or disqualification.
The case I have in mind arose in the Municipal Court of the City of New
York. It was a negligence case, and one of the parties had served a demand
fqr admissions under Section 322. It occurred to the adversary party to
contend that Section 322 was not applicable to negligence actions. Accord-
ingly, a motion was made to vacate the demand. Strangely enough, the
motion was granted, and I understand an appeal was taken to the Appellate
Term.
There seems no reason to doubt that Section 322 is applicable to actions
generally, and it would seem to be particularly useful both to plaintiffs and
defendants in negligence cases. Furthermore, Section 322, as above indi-
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cated, contemplates no motion addressed to the sufficiency of the demand;
it obviously contemplates a simple exchange of documents, the determination
of questions relating to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the refusal
to make the admission being reserved until the trial "or immediately follow-
ing the trial." s Thus, a reversal will probably follow, and the case will then
be in one of those procedural messes which cause so much dissatisfaction
with the law.
HOSPITAL RECORDS
Much confusion has resulted from use of the word "hearsay" in the vari-
ous opinions written on this subject. The term is unfortunate because it has
so many different meanings. From a technical legal standpoint, every writing
is "hearsay"; oral testimony of a conversation with the adversary party is
"hearsay"; but admissions generally constitute an exception to the hearsay
rule of exclusion, and numerous documents, when properly authenticated,
become admissible in evidence under various other exceptions. I suppose
one might say that "hearsay" thus made admissible for one reason or another
is no longer "hearsay." This approach, however, is not merely confusing
and apt to lead one into considerable circular reasoning; the real difficulty is
that Section 374-a simply will not bear an inteipretation which makes an
entry admissible if it does not contain hearsay but not admissible if it does
contain hearsay.
The test of admissibility is "if the trial judge shall find that it was made
in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of
such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act,
transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter."
Section 374-a continues, "all other circunmstances of the making of such
writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or
maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissi-
bility." Accordingly, it seems plain that the test of admissibility cannot be
whether the entry records something said by a party to the action or by
some third party, such as a bystander or otherwise unidentified volunteer.
If such were the test and, as often is the case, the hospital record gives no
inkling of the source of the information recorded, the court would be required
to exclude the record despite proof that it had been made in the regular
course of business and that it was the regular course of such business to
make the entry.
3Cf. Banca Nazionale Di Credito v. Equitable Trust Co., 221 App. Div. 555, 224
N. Y. S. 617 (Ist Dep't 1927); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL
RULES (1938) 2660-1.
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True it is that in the police blotter cases, which first presented the problem,
the courts made reference to the fact that "The policeman who made it
was not present at the time of the accident." 4 But the decision would have
been no different had it so happened that the particular officer who made
the blotter entry was an eye-witness to the event he recorded. The test and
the ground of decision was "The memorandum in question was not made
in the regular course of any business, profession, occupation or calling."15
In so holding, the Court of Appeals, in Johnson v. Lutz, was called upon
to interpret the statute, as it was contended that the making of such blotter
entries by policemen as required by police regulations, was a making of an
entry in "the regular course of any business."
This, it seems to me, as I indicated in my last address before this associa-
tion, must be the sound method of approach, unless we are completely
to disregard the language of the statute and say that the courts should decide
the matter in the way they consider most expedient and just. 6
In Del Re v. City of New York,7 Mr. Justice Steinbrink laid down the rule
which I think should prevail. The infant plaintiff in that case had been
injured in the subway. He claimed the train had made an "unusual" stop,
and defendant claimed that plaintiff was pushed by another boy" in the course
of a little roughhousing. Specific objection was made to the portion of the
hospital record which stated "patient was riding in subway, when it came
to a sudden stop, at 25th Ave. & 86th St." The trial court overruled the
objection, and the judgment for plaintiff entered on the jury's verdict was
reversed by the Appellate Term on the ground that this portion of the
hospital record should have been excluded. This result is placed squarely
on the proper ground, namely, that
It was the business of the hospital to diagnose the patient's condition
and to treat him, not to record a statement derived from an unidentified
source describing the manner in which the patient's injuries were
sustained.
In passing, it is interesting to note that even so scholarly and precise a
jurist as Mr. Justice Steinbrink could not resist the temptation to bolster up
the result by reference to the "unidentified source" of the information re-
corded. It would have made no difference, as I read the statute, whether
4Needle v. New York Railways Corp., 227 App. Div. 276, 237 N. Y. S. 547 (1st
Dep't 1929) ; Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N. Y. 124, 170 N. E. 517 (1930).5Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N. Y. 124, 127, 170 N. E. 517, 518 (1930).6An inquiry in each class of cases into the "trustworthiness of the records" amounts
to the same thing. See Note (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 392.
7180 Misc. 525, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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or not the identity of the source was established or whether that source was
the patient himself. And this result must be the same whether the entry
is offered by one party or the other, whether it be in the nature of an ad-
mission or a self-servingj declaration. The question is, "Was the entry made
in the regular course of business and was it the regular course of business
to make such entry?"
The Del Re decision is significant and helpful because it rests upon a sound
reading of the statute and upon a sound basis of fact, as everyone knows
that it is not the business of the hospital to make a record of the manner
in which accidents occur.8
The balance of the opinion is interesting. Three leading cases are cited:
Palmer v. Hoffinan,9 in which Mr. Justice Douglas, in affirming a ruling
which excluded a written statement by the engineer of a train when inter-
viewed after an accident by a representative of the railroad and a repre-
sentative of the Massachusetts Public Utilities Commission, as "not a record
made for the systematic conduct of the business as a business," made a
classic analysis of the similar federal statute, and People v. Kohlmeyer, °
and Meiselnzn v. Crown Heights Hospital," both discussed by me in my
last address.
One other case of considerable importance is mentioned, but not discussed
at length, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Steinbrink, doubtless because it had
little bearing on the specific issue presented in the Del Re case. I refer to
Roberto v. Nielson.'2
In the Roberto case the hospital records contained the two following state-
ments, described in the record in that case as defendant's Exhibits B and C
for identification:
C. C. Auto accident. The patient is too limited in vocabulary, and
too groggy from drink and paralydehide to give a very good story,
but evidently, after a day of beer ,and wine drinking, he was somehow
involved in an auto accident. The actuality of the coma was not elicited,
but the patient was brought in by police. (Ital. the Court's.)
Pt [patient] is very inco-operative. Adequate determination of men-
tal state is impossible (states that he has been drunk and says that he
has had an injection in arm).
SCf. Constantinides v. Manhattan Transit'Co., 264 App. Div. 147, 34 N. Y. S. (2d)
600 (1st Dep't 1942)..
9318 U. S. 109, 63 Sup. Ct. 477 (1943).
10284 N. Y. 366, 31 N. E. (2d) 490 (1940).
11285 N. Y. 389, 34 N. E. (2d) 367 (1941).
12262 App. Div. 1035, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 334 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd without opinion,
288 N. Y. 581, 42 N. E. (2d) 27 (1942), Loughran, Rippey and Conway, JJ., dissenting.
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The Appellate Division reversed a judgment entered on a verdict in plain-
tiff's favor and directed a new trial on the ground that both exhibits were
erroneously excluded, with the exception of the italicized portion of defend-
ant's Exhibit B for identification above set forth. Mr. Justice Hagarty
concurred in the result, and Mr. Justice Close dissented and voted to affirm.
The affirmnance and entry of judgment absolute in the Court of Appeals was
by a 4 to 3 vote.
What is it about these particular hospital records that makes the question
so difficult? Why did not the Court of Appeals make this case the occasion
for a definitive opinion settling the various questions of the interpretation of
Section 374-a, which have so perplexed the Bar and the trial courts?
Perhaps one person's guess is as good as another's. It is my thought that
there would probably be no difference of opinion whatever among the judges
of the Court of Appeals were the statement in the hospital record a mere
recital of how the accident occurred. The difficulty is that it is the business
of those connected with hospitals to make some ascertainment of facts bear-
ing upon the nature of the injuries which the patient has sustained to guide
the doctors in their diagnosis and treatment. The exhibits in the Roberto
case are on the borderline; they may be interpreted either way by reasonable
men. If the true rule is that a mere recording of the way in which the
accident occurred is to be ruled out and a recital of facts bearing upon the
patient's condition and the nature of his injuries is to be ruled in, it is easy
to understand why the Roberto case was not a very good one in which to
formulate any rule. Another circumstance of no mean importance is that
there is never any way of telling how much some individual member of the
Court of Appeals may be influenced by the stipulation for judgment abso-
lute, which leaves the court no alternative, in the event of affirmance, than
to enter final judgment against the appellant.
All this leads me to acase decided in May, 1944, in the Supreme Court
of Kings County. In Cerniglia v. City of New York,'3 Mr. Justice Swezey
had under consideration a motion by plaintiffs to set aside a verdict and for
a new trial on the groind of the admission of the following portion of a
hospital record:
Plaintiff states that she fell down as she was getting off a street car.
She -doesn't recall how she fell but thinks her heels slipped on the street.
The motion was denied, and the court, in holding that the above quoted
portion of the hospital record had been properly admitted, based the decision
13182 Misc. 441, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 447 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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upon the Kohlneyer case, the Meiselman case and the Roberto case, to which
I have already referred.
It seems to me that the Cerniglia case is not properly decided. It is cer-
tainly at direct variance with the Del Re case, in which Mr. Justice Stein-
brink wrote for the Appellate Term. The hospital record in the Cerniglia
case was a mere recital of how the accident occurred, and it should not have
been admitted unless the courts are prepared to say that it is the business
of a hospital to make a record of the manner in which accidents occur. Nor
do I see anything in the Roberto case, much less in the Kohlnwyer or Meisel-
mian cases, to require the decision made in the Cerniglia' case.
Before leaving this subject it may be well to emphasize a point which is
referred to in almost every one of the cases in some form or another. It
will not suffice, when a hospital record is offered in its entirety, for the other
side merely to object in general terms as incompetent, irrelevant and imma-
terial. The objection should be specific and should be addressed to the par-
ticular porfion of the hospital record which it is claimed is not admissible
under Section 374-a. Incidentally, this is the practice which was followed
in the Del Re case, and in the Cerniglia case as well.
ATTACHIENTS
With every passing day more grief, is piling up in connection with the
"streamlining" of the attachment procedure in 1940 and 1941. I need not
repeat the criticisms which I have voiced here on previous occasions. Perhaps
one of the obstacles to changes in this unsatisfactory state of the law is
that it is hard to figure out changes which should not further complicate
liens and other interests in property running into millions of dollars. With
the continuance of the war and the freezing of the assets of individuals and
corporations located in many of the countries of Continental Europe, it must
be admitted that the requirement of the bringing of an action within 90 days
after the attachment or the obtaining of an extension of time has worked
great hardship.
There are two points, however, which may now perhaps be discussed with
some profit. The first of these relates to the procedure in obtaining exten-
sions under Section 922. In Garey v. Tobey,'4 an extension for a compara-
tively short period was obtained on plaintiff's behalf during the 90-day
period. Later, and after the expiration of the 90-day period, plaintiff ob-
tained another ex parte extension. On a motion to vacate the second exten-
1449 N. Y. S. (2d) 612 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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sion, Mr. Justice Koch granted the motion on the ground that Section 922
contained the clause "provided that a certified copy of the said order is, prior
to the expiration of the said 90 days, served. . . ." He also referred to
somewhat similar language in the same paragraph of Section 922, which
contained the words "prior to the expiration of said 90 days." This un-
necessarily strict interpretation of the section was rejected by the Appellate
Division.Y5 The reversal in the Appellate Division was by a unanimous
court, the memorandum decision reading in its entirety:
Civil Practice Act Section 922 does not limit the extensions which
may be granted to a single period of 90 days.
This seems to be a sound interpretation of the legislative intent.1 6 To hold
otherwise would certainly put plaintiffs in a sad predicament.
This brings me to .the collateral question of how long an extension the
court may grant, in the exercise of its discretion. I have received informa-
tion about a large number of these ex parte extensions, most of which are
for periods of days or a few months. Several of these orders, however, have
extended the time to a period of months after the termination of the war,'7
or after postal communications are reinstated with the country in which
the interested party resides.' 8 I see no reason to doubt the validity and
propriety of these orders.
On the other hand, in one case where no extension whatever had been
procured during the ninety-day period, an extension was given nunc pro tuinc
until six months after the war. In my opinion this order is a nullity, as
subdivision 2 of Section 922 seems clearly to provide that if no extension
has been obtained and no action begun, as provided in subdivision 1, "the
levy shall be void." Perhaps the courts may take a more lenient view, but
I do not see how the validity of inuc pro tulnc orders can be reconciled with
the Section as it now reads.
There is another matter which may conceivably cause serious difficulty.
If a warrant of attachment is levied by the service of a certified copy of the
warrant upon some third person claimed to be indebted to the defendant,
15268 App. Div. 853 (1944).
IeThe first extension obtained in Garey v. Tobey was obtained within the ninety-day
period prescribed in Section 922 and was for ninety additional days. The second exten-
sion, obtained before the expiration of the time granted in the first extension order,
but after the expiration of the ninety-day period prescribed in Section 922, was for an
additional one hundred and twenty days.
17 See, for example, the order granted on September 13, 1943, in Savatier v. Bergerat,
N. Y. County Clerk's Index No. 11515 (1943).
18See order granted in Bendiks v. De Gruyter, N. Y. County Clerk's Index No. 17542
(1943).
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the levy is, according to the plain., provisions of Section 922, void unless
an' action is brought within the ninety-dayrperiod or an extension of time
obtained, as explained above. I am informed that the number of instances
where, either through inadvertence or neglect or ignorance of the law or for
some other reason, attachment proceedings have thus become -void is quite
large, and the amounts involved run into the millions. The sheriff claims
to be entitled to poundage feds, but in -no instance known to me has the mat-
ter been brought tQ an issue.
Section 1558, subdivision 18, provides in substance that where a levy has
been made under a warrant of attachment. and, the w-arrant of attachment is
vacated or set aside or otherwise discharged by order of the court, the sheriff
is entitled to poundage upon the-value of the property attached, with certain
limitations. Thus far no order has been made which could be construed
as vacating or setting aside or otherwise discharging any one of these war-
rants of attachment or the levies made thereunder. This is what apparently
is a source of some discomfiture to the sheriff, who vigorously asserts that
orders sh ould be" entered in all these cases and -that, even" in the absence of
an order,:he'still has a lien for his poundage fees. Perhaps some day some-
one will accommodate the sheriff by making a motion for an order vacating,
setting aside or otherwise discharging one of .these attachments. In the
meantime, the matter rests in riubibhs.
JUDICIAL "NoTxCE 0F MATTERS OF LAW
Upon the recommendation of the Judicial Council a new Section of the
Civil Practice, Act,'Section 344-a, became effective September 1, 1943. It
represents an immense amount of research and study and is a carefully
integrated treatment of the entire subject of judicial notice of matters of
law. It represents one of the finest pieces of procedural draftsmanship that
has come to my attention. In substance it abolishes most of the confusing
exceptions which so delighted the hearts of Bar examiners as far back as I
can remember. For example, the court may now take judicial notice of a
private act of the New York Legislature or of the Congress of the United
States; it may also take judicial notice of the city ordinances of any city,
county, town or village in the State of New York, and it may take judicial
notice of any "law, statute, proclamation, edict, decree, ordinance, or the
unwritten or common. law of a sister state, a territory or other jurisdiction
of the United States, or of a foreign country or political subdivision thereof."
One of the most significant provisions of this new section is subdivision
(D), which provides:
[Vol. 30
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The failure of either party to plead any matter of law specified in this
Section shajl-,not be held to preclude either the trial or appellate court
from taking judicial notice thereof.
While Section 391, relative to proof of. statutes, decrees and. decisions of
another state anci..country, remaitis, that, Section.,has been amended so as
specifically to- provide that the books of reports of-cases must be admitted as
presumptive evidence "'of the unwritten or common law thereof." It would
seem that most, if. not all, of the old technicalities have been eliminated. ,
While the Section in general terms merely provides that 'the court may in
its discretion take judicial notice of the matters enumerated, it is interesting
to observe that the general preliminary paragraph to this effect is-qualified
by the well-known phrase "except as otherwise expressly required by law."
This qualification was added to avoid conflict with Section 982-8.0 of the
Administiative Code of the City of New York, which reads as follows:
Judicial Notice. a. All courts shall take judicial notice of all laws
contained in this code, the charter, local laws, ordinances, the sanitary
code, resolutiofns, and of all rules and regulations adopted *,pursuant to
law.
b. The supplements to the charter and, code published pursuant to
Section three hundred ninety-seven of the charter and the compilation
of rules and regulations published pursuant to Section eight hundred
eighty-five of the charter shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of
the authenticity of the provisions contained therein.'
There is an excellent discussion of the scope and effec t of the new Section
by Leonard S. Saxe, Executive Secretary of the New Yo k State Judicial
Council, in an article, "New York Extends Judicial Notice to -latters of
°Law," appearing in the October, 1944, issue of the Journal of the America
Judicature Society,19 which will amply repay a careful reading.
LImITATIONS OF TIME AFFECTING NON-REsmENTS
To students and law teachers who would otherwise be required to go
through the mental anguish of attempting to understand and reconcile the
conflicting .and obscure provisions of Sections 13, 19 and 55. of the Civil
Practice Act, relative to non-residents and causes of action aris'ing out of
the state, the amendments to Sections 13 and 19 and the new Section. '55,
all of which were passed in 1943, upon recommendation 'fthe Law Revision
Commission, will come as a great relief. Without going into any lengtti
explanation, it may suffice to say that one of-the thinks accomplished 'by
10(1944) 28 J. Al!. JuD. Soc. 86. '-,<''
1945]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
these sections in their present form is to incorporate the effect of the decisions
in Meyers v. Credit Lyonnais,2 ° Kirsch v. Lubin,2 and National Surety
Company v. Ruffin.2 2 The effect of these decisions is now apparent upon the
face of the Sections as they appear in the Civil Practice Act.
In addition, to overcome the effect of Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corpora-
tion,2 3 to the effect that the statute of limitations was not tolled against a
non-resident because of the right to serve the Secretary of State under
Section 52 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, it is now provided in Section 19
that the section is inapplicable while a "voluntary or involuntary" designa-
tion made in pursuance of law remains in force. Certain other excellent
changes were made in Section 19, which I will not take the time to discuss,
as the subject is fully reviewed in the 1943 Report of the Law Revision
Commission.
2 4
Another change of considerable practical importance was made in Section
19. The old provision that if, after a cause of action has accrued against a
person, he departs from the state and remains continuously absent therefrom
for a space of one year or more, the time of his absence is not part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action, has been amended so that
instead of one year the period has now been reduced to four months. In
this connection there is a curious discrepancy between the Section as it now
appears and the reviser's notes as published in the standard editions of the
Civil Practice Act. The note describes the present period as "60 days,"
whereas the section reads "4 months." This discrepancy is due to the fact
that the Law Revision Commission recommended the sixty-day period, but
the bill was amended in the Legislature to provide for a period of four
months.
MISCELLANEOUS
Of the remaining changes made by the Legislature I have selected, as in
the past, the four in 1943 and the four in 1944 which seem to me to be the
most important from a purely practical standpoint.
They are as follows:
1. There is a new Article 79 of the Civil Practice Act (Sections 1307-18)
20259 N. Y. 399, 182 N. E. 61 (1932).
21131 Misc. 700, 228 N. Y. S. 94 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd 223 App. Div. 826, 228 N. Y. S.
825 (Ist Dep't 1928), aff'd 248 N. Y. 645, 162 N. E. 560 (1928).22242 N. Y. 413, 152 N. E. 246 (1926).
23253 App. Div. 249, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 749 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd 278 N. Y. 576,
16 N. E. (2d) 110 (1938).241943 REPORT, RECOMmENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAw REVIsIoN Com fissIoN
[Legis. Doc. (1943) No. 65 (F)] 127 et seq.
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which creates and outlines the procedure of an alternative manner of pro-
ceeding in the Supreme Court with respect to express trusts. The new special
proceeding by order to show cause may be used for accountings and con-
structions of inter vivos trusts in lieu of proceeding. as before by action.
This will simplify and expedite the disposition of this increasingly important
phase of legal practice.
2. Section 110-a as amended now permits removal to a court having
jurisdiction (generally the Supreme Court) where it appears "that the title
to real property will come in question" and the court in which the action or
proceeding is pending is without jurisdiction.
3. It will be recalled that Section 485 permits the entry of a default
judgment by the clerk in actions based upon contracts to pay a sum of money
fixed by the terms of the contract or capable of being ascertained by com-
putation only, and certain other enumerated cases of a similar character
where the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only. Sections
230, 231, 486, 489 and 493 have been amended so as to permit the entry
of judgment by the clerk in the instances specified in Section 485 where there
has been substituted service of the summons. Formerly this procedure was
not available where personal jurisdiction depended upon substituted service.
4. Section 1490 now gives an appellate court in actions at law the same
right as previously existed in equity cases, in its discretion to withhold costs
from the successful party on an appeal.
5. Section 577 has been repealed. Section 616 has been amended and a
new Section 170-a was added, all in 1944, so that where the adversary attor-
neys refuse or fail to stipulate waiving certification, an affidavit by the
attorney furnishing the papers on appeal shall take the place of a certificate.
This will effectively put a stop to a practice which has become all too common
with a few attorneys to make some pretext for refusing to waive certification
and thus put the other side to the unnecessary expense of having the record
certified by the clerk.
6. On the recommendation of the Executive Committee of the Surrogates
Association of the State of New York, Section 354 has been amended so as
to permit an attorney or his employees to testify "as td the revocation of a
will" in addition to the provisions already contained in that section relative
to testimony as to the preparation and execution of a will, indenture or deed
of trust.
7. Another very excellent innovation is contained in the new Section
578-a, which provides that where an appeal is taken within five days before
the time when the time of the party upon whom the notice of appeal is
19451
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served will expire, the time of the party so served to:aipeal shall be extended
ten days, after suchservice. Where a party has been partially successful in
the court of original jurisdiction, the occasion frequently arises where one
party has decided that he will appeal only.-df the other side appeals. As this
state of mind is frequently anticipated by the adversary, there has been a
certain amount of jockeying in the past in an attempt to serve the notice
of appeal at the very last moment in the hope that through- some slip-up the
service of notice of the cross-appeal will come too late or will not be filed
in time or be subject to some other defect. The new Section will eliminate
the necessity for any worry on this' score.
.8. Section 1450 now provides that the making of a contract or submission
for arbitration, providing for arbitration in this state, shall be deemed a con-
sent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of this state
to enforce the contract or submission. Further amendments of the Section
relate to the manner of service and include, after enumerating personal
service and substituted service, the general clause "or upon satisfactory proof
that the party aggrieved has been or will be unable with due diligence to
make service in any of the foregoing manners, then such notice shall be
served in such manner as the court or judge may direct." Some doubt has
been expressed as to the validity of this provision, but it seems likely to be
sustained except in cases where the notice directed by the court or judge
would plainly not constitute due process.
CONCLUSION
No person of ripe experience in litigated matters in the State of New York
can examine the changes made in the past two years in matters of pleading,
practice and procedure without being struck by the combination of practical
wisdom, scholarly research and dislike of technicalities which has brought
about these salutary reforms. Great- credit is due to the judicial Council,
which has been responsible for most of them. One cannot escape the con-
viction that, whatever may have been the case in the past, our judges to-day
are painstaking and alert to make 'our rules and regulations of procedure
and practice a well-oiled and up-to-date machine capable of administering
justice with a minimum of error.
One of the very natural effects of the war has been a considerable lessening
of the amount of tinkering with the Civil Practice Act and other.statutes
affecting procedure by the Legislature, which has been a more or less common
experience in the past. Fortunately; there is now,..and has been' for some
y ears, an increasingdemand for placing the rules _Qf procedure unider the
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control and supervision of the Court of Appeals. This is where the power
to make such rules should reside. The experience with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, adopted by the Supreme Court after the most careful
and exhaustive study, and then at infrequent intervals amended in an orderly
and systematic fashion, is a most valuable and reassuring guide.
It is my hope that the Bar, as a whole, will place itself solidly behind this
most desirable and substantial reform.
Doubtless some voices may be heard in opposition. The Bar is never
unanimous on any subject, nor would it be a healthy state of affairs if such
were the case. I trust, however, that none of those here present will be
induced to lend their influence in opposition because they may be led to believe
that there is some sinister and hidden motive behind the movement to place
the control and supervision of court procedure in the Court of Appeals, or
that the movement is designed to'bring about some particular new procedure
which he may dislike. The demonstrable fact is that the movement now under
way has for its sole purpose the placing of this power in the Court of Appeals.
No human being can foretell, nor could any man or group of men have the
influence to bring about, any particular changes in the existing procedure.
If this power is given to the Court of Appeals, the court will then appoint,
as did the Supreme Court of the United States, a group of distinguished
and competent lawyers, and, I hope, judges as well, who will in the course of
time produce for submission to the court proposed rules of procedure with
their recommendation that these rules be adopted. It is fair to assume that
such a group will approach the task with an open mind and a determination
to do the best they can.
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